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Abstract— The design of a solution for the authentication of 
both navigation data bits and spreading code chips, referred to as 
SNAP and suitable for the evolution of the Galileo E1 OS signal, 
is presented in the paper. Though the technique is innovative and 
able to achieve predefined authentication performance, it exploits 
the structure of the legacy Galileo signal and the characteristics 
of the OS NMA. 
A detailed overview of the open choices for the design of 
signal components dedicated to authentication is provided, 
together with an analysis of signal parameters definition. A 
possible implementation option of the SNAP solution is also 
presented.  
Keywords—Spreading code and navigation data based 
authentication proposal; Galileo; open service;  navigation message 
authentication;  spreading code authentication.  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Though the vulnerability of Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems (GNSSs) to Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) is a 
reason of concern since many years [1], the awareness of this 
kind of threats has been recently further strengthen, also thanks 
to the increased number of reported events of intentional 
interference [2].  
The large availability of personal jammer devices, that can 
be easily purchased over the web and (illegally) used, makes 
them the primary source of intentional interference, both of 
malicious and uninformed nature. According to the 
classification given in [3], jamming broadcasted on or near 
GNSS frequencies is intended to damage GNSS users 
(malicious interference), but in the majority of the cases, there 
is no the intent to cause harm to third parties (uninformed 
interference) [4]. In addition, in the last years the attention 
went more to structured forms of interference, known as 
spoofing attacks, which have the goal of producing false 
information within the victim receiver. Not only the feasibility 
of such attacks have been widely demonstrated trough 
experiments and trials [5][6], but, more recently, their real 
implementation in the civil domain has been also documented 
[2]. 
Several anti-spoofing techniques have been proposed 
[7][8], based on a wide variety of different approaches. A first 
macro classification of such methods separates among those 
implemented at the receiver level and those directly applied at 
the signal level. The formers work on specific observables 
available along the receiver chain (e.g., antenna-aided 
techniques, methods based on the signal power monitoring or 
consistency check with other navigation sensors); while a 
second group consists of techniques that implement civil-signal 
authentication and cryptographic defense algorithms [9]. In this 
sense, a proper partition between system and receiver 
contribution to the robustness against spoofing represents a key 
aspect [10], in order to take advantage from both 
cryptographically secure features in the Signal In Space (SIS), 
and the implementation of non-cryptographic countermeasures. 
In the design of the authentication solutions for a new 
generation of civil GNSS signals one can act on different 
signal’s components. As described in [10], the Navigation 
Message Authentication (NMA) denotes the protection of the 
navigation message bits (i.e., the full data frame or a portion of 
it) and can be implemented by digitally signing the navigation 
data, thus keeping the navigation message unencrypted. 
Spreading Code Authentication (SCA) inserts, within the 
nominal (unencrypted) spreading code, unpredictable portions 
of chips, which are later verified through cryptographic 
functions. 
Within this context, the work has been encouraged by the 
need of increasing the level of the SIS robustness, required in 
many applications. The paper proposes an authentication 
concept able to exploit some of the characteristics of the 
current Galileo Open Service (OS) signal [11] and those of the 
OS NMA [12], that will be transmitted starting from 2018 [13]. 
The paper firstly provides a detailed analysis on the open 
choices for the design of signal components dedicated to 
authentication, describing tangible benefits and considering 
possible limitations of each solutions. In addition, on the basis 
of the presented analysis, the paper presents the Spreading 
code and Navigation data based Authentication Proposal 
(SNAP), a solution to provide authentication both at the 
navigation data and spreading code levels and tailored to the 
evolution of the Galileo E1 OS signal. In detail, the proposed 
approach builds upon the structure and the characteristics of the 
OS NMA, thus being capable of increasing its spoofing 
robustness performance. 
  
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: section 
II provides an overview of the signal design aspects relevant 
for authentication at the spreading code level, while section III 
is dedicated to the description of the SNAP concept. After 
investigating the performance of the solution under different 
families of spoofing attacks (section IV), a trade-off analysis, 
addressed to the definition of the solution parameters, is 
presented in section V. Section VI drafts a possible 
implementation of the SNAP concept, referred to as working 
point. The conclusions of the work are summarized in section 
VII, that also highlights the open points and sketches some 
ideas for future activities.  
II. SIGNAL DESIGN: A GENERAL OVERVIEW 
In the design of the signal authentication solutions one can 
act on different signal’s components. NMA and SCA 
techniques work at the navigation message and spreading code 
levels respectively, but in principle signal components 
dedicated to authentication can be also inserted at other levels, 
e.g., unpredictable features at subcarrier or carrier level, as 
variable pulse shaping, frequency hopping, etc. 
The options for the design of an authentication solution 
based on spreading code are listed in Fig. 1. It presents a tree 
for each parameter that is considered relevant for the SCA 
authentication technique. The main possible parameters’ 
alternatives, as identified by the authors, are listed as tree’s 
leaves. In light orange are highlighted those ideas still draft, not 
consolidated in the literature and/or not demonstrated to be 
feasible. Though the discussion of the impact of each choice is 
out of the scope of the paper, for the sake of examples four of 
the most relevant aspects are analyzed hereafter: the High-
Level Authentication Concept, the Signal Component, the 
Relative Power Level, and the Distribution of Chips over Time. 
The choice of a specific High-Level Authentication Concept 
has an intrinsic impact on the achievable performance and on 
the implied complexity at both the system and user levels. 
Among the concepts available in the public literature, the 
following ones can be considered particularly relevant: 
 Spread Spectrum Security Codes (SSSC) [14], 
especially the Public-SCA concept, similar to the 
hidden markers proposed in [15], is one of the 
simplest authentication approaches working at the 
spreading code level. The public-SCA is based on the 
idea of inserting bursts on unpredictable chips, called 
SSSC bursts, in the open spreading code sequence. 
The SSSC bursts are interleaved with a time division 
approach;  
 Signal Authentication Sequences (SAS) is an approach 
similar to the previous one and described in [16] and 
[17]; 
 Supersonic Codes [18][19] is a sophisticated concept, 
suitable to implement a robust authentication 
technique, at the cost of a remarkable increase of the 
complexity. It exploits the Code Shift Keying (CSK) 
modulation principle for authentication purposes. The 
basic idea is to apply circular shifts to some or all the 
spreading code periods (i.e. partial or complete CSK) 
in order to encode specific data symbols; 
 new emerging solutions can also be considered, 
together with techniques resulting from combinations 
or adaptations of existing ideas. Among others, it is 
worth mentioning the Chips-Message Robust 
Authentication (CHIMERA), recently proposed in 
[20] for the GPS L1C signal. 
As for the Signal Component, the authentication schemes 
can basically be implemented in two ways: by modifying an 
existing signal component (e.g., E1-B, E1-C, E5a, E5b) or by 
introducing a new one (e.g., E1-D or non-SIS channel). A new 
component offers more flexibility in the design of the 
authentication scheme, thus reducing the constraints related to 
the backward compatibility. In addition, in the case existing 
signal components are used, possible performance degradations 
for non-participant users have to be considered. Alternative 
options can include the use a non-SIS channel with an 
architecture based on a remote authentication server [20]. 
The choices for the Relative Power Level of the 
authentication component basically are: same power as other 
open components, lower power level (e.g. 1/11 of the nominal 
power), or variable power (i.e. amplitude modulation). Low 
power level options tend to increase the robustness against 
some spoofing attacks (i.e., requiring high gain antennas), 
though they affect the authentication performance of 
participant receivers, mainly in terms of conventional metrics 
as the Time Between Authentication (TBA), the Time To Alarm 
(TTA), and the Time To First Authenticated Fix (TTFAF), due 
to a reduction on the effective Carrier to Noise ratio (    ⁄ ) of 
the received signal. 
Last but not least, the Distribution of Authentication Chips 
over Time is another relevant aspect to be properly designed. 
Apart the case of having a full encrypted sequence of chips 
(that, strictly speaking, belongs to the category of Spreading 
Code Encryption – SCE – and thus is beyond the SCA 
options), there are basically two types of distribution of the 
chips over time: time division and time hopping.  
In the former case, dedicated slots are allocated for the 
SCA bursts, while in latter a randomized pattern is used for the 
time allocation of cryptographically generated spreading code 
chips. The time division was first proposed in the SSSC 
concept [14], while the time hopping approach, also known as 
“puncturing”, is adopted for example in CHIMERA [20], 
where both the punctured code chips (i.e. “marker frames”) and 
their insertion pattern in the spreading code (i.e. “look-up table 
schedule”) are cryptographically generated.  
Considering not only a system perspective but also a 
receiver point of view, it must be highlighted that the time 
division and time hopping options present different advantages 
and specific drawbacks that can be summarized as follows: 
 if an existing open signal is modified, the time 
division offers a lower backward compatibility, since 
systematic portions of the signal are unsuitable to be 
tracked  by a legacy receiver. On the other hand, a 
punctured code (i.e. time hopping) can still be tracked, 
  
with an equivalent     ⁄  degradation proportional to 
the percentage of punctured chips [10] [20]; 
 a time hopping with an unpredictable insertion pattern 
significantly increases the complexity both at system 
level and receiver level. In fact, both the punctured 
code and the insertion pattern have to be 
cryptographically generated. In addition, the receiver 
is forced to store both open and encrypted code chips 
(i.e. several seconds of raw signal samples), while a 
deterministic time division approach allows to easily 
discard all the open code portions (e.g. 90% of the 
time), thus obtaining a significant memory saving; 
 a deterministic time division shows a potentially 
higher vulnerability to “denial of service” attacks. In 
fact, if the position of the SCA bursts is known a 
priori, an attacker can possibly implement a 
systematic jamming of these signal portions [21]. 
Even if this kind of attack is easy to implement, it can 
be associated to a lower risk with respect to spoofing 
attacks, because it can be easily detected (with a 
failure on the authentication process) and it cannot 
force the victim receiver to compute a false  position; 
 the time hopping option can be considered as more 
vulnerable to specific spoofing attacks. In fact, 
considering the overall entropy of the punctured code 
chips, their distribution over long time windows (e.g. 
3 minutes in the case of the “slow” channel of in 
CHIMERA [20]) can potentially reduce the 
effectiveness of the solution against specific spoofers.  
Concerning the last item it must be noted that, for instance, 
the principle of the State Modeling Attack (proposed against 
NMA in [22] ) can be generalized to work also at the spreading 
code level. In this case, the spoofer can try to transmit random 
guesses of the punctured code chips and then a-posteriori 
verifies the correctness of its guesses. To do so, it needs to 
estimate the correct code sequences with multiple high-gain 
directional antennas (one for each satellite in view, see section 
IV), or to be connected to a remote server with such resources. 
If the spoofer is capable to perform such verification with a 
limited latency (e.g. few microseconds), it can compensate 
possible errors in previous random guesses by increasing the 
transmission power of the following code chips. Aiming to 
maximize the success rate of the attack, it can also combine 
this basic idea with more sophisticate strategies, as those 
mentioned in [21], [22], or [23]. In this sense, a time division 
solution would concentrate the same entropy (at the spreading 
code level) in a shorter time slot, thus introducing more 
stringent constraints from a spoofer perspective (i.e. less time 
to guess/estimate/modify future code chips). 
A proper design of the distribution of the chips over time 
requires a careful tradeoff between previous aspects and 
strongly depends on the specific application requirements and 
on the receiver constraints. Focusing on civil mass-market 
receivers, the time division approach offers significant savings 
in terms of memory and computational resources and a better 
robustness against specific attacks, thus it will be considered in 
the following discussion as a preferable option. 
III. THE SNAP SOLUTION 
After a brief description of the prefixed requirements of 
design (section III.A), the SNAP solution is presented hereafter 
(section III.B), together with a proposal for the possible time 
scheduling of the SCA bursts (section III.C). 
A. Prefixed Requirements  
In the design of the SNAP the main objective was twofold: 
provide authentication solution addressed to civil applications 
and receivers, and, at the same time, suitable for the evolution 
of the current Galileo E1 OS signal.  
This means that the solution must: 
 be able to raise the bar against spoofing, inserting 
cryptographic features at the spreading code level, 
hard to predict/ extract/ manipulate by attackers, thus 
forcing a potential spoofer to use multiple high-gain 
directional antennas; 
 be easy to process and verify by participant receivers, 
e.g., mass-market devices without tamper resistant 
modules; 
and, at the same time: 
 reuse the OS NMA cryptographic data; 
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the main signal design aspects relevant for authentication at the spreading code level.  
  
 offer an additional protection to the E1 OS signal 
against specific spoofing attacks; 
 not make the E1 OS obsolete. In fact, the main goal is 
to provide a service capable of authenticating the 
current Galileo E1 OS signal, i.e.: E1-B/C. This does 
not necessary imply the modification of current OS 
components, as long as the solutions implemented 
through the use of other (new) signal components are 
capable to also authenticate the E1-B/C signals. 
B. The high level concept  
The design of the SNAP technique has been initially 
inspired from other solutions available in the state of the art, 
mainly focusing on the benefits of the following three 
approaches: the public-SCA concept [14], the Supersonic 
Codes [18][19], and the Signature-Amortization scheme. The 
former two are briefly described in the previous section, while 
the Signature-Amortization is an NMA concept, presented in 
[24], and alternative with respect to the OS NMA [25] [26]. 
The rationale behind the SNAP solution is to introduce 
segments of spreading code chips in the SIS that can be 
considered as unpredictable from a spoofer perspective, but 
can be easily a-posteriori verified by a participant receiver. The 
benefits of a CSK modulation scheme are also exploited in 
order to enhance the flexibility and the authentication 
performance of the scheme, as discussed later. 
In detail, the SNAP foresees the use of two types of SCA 
bursts, inserted in the open pseudo-random noise (PRN) code 
sequence with a time division approach and at different rates, 
as illustrated for example in Fig. 2. 
Slow SCA bursts (indicated in yellow as CSKS in Fig. 2) 
allow for a robust a-posteriori verification with moderate 
latency (e.g., TBA of about 10 seconds). On the other hand, 
fast SCA bursts (indicated in green as CSKF in Fig. 2) are 
inserted at higher rate in the PRN code sequence, being 
intended to reduce the TBA (e.g. to about 2 seconds) under a 
wide set of spoofing attacks. 
Both slow and fast bursts should be cryptographically 
generated and a-posteriori verified by participant receivers. For 
the sake of simplicity but without losing of generality, the 
following presentation of the SNAP concept is based on two 
main assumptions:  
 the inputs of the bursts generation are exclusively 
based on the re-use of the E1-B OS NMA data [25] 
[26], as the Timed Efficient Stream Loss-Tolerant 
Authentication (TESLA) key chain and Message 
Authentication Code (MAC) tags; 
 the bursts are allocated on a generic signal component 
(i.e. a modified E1-B or E1-C, or a new component). 
These initial assumptions are reasonable for a conservative 
scenario, aiming to a SNAP implementation with minimal 
changes and complexity increase at system/receiver level. 
Other relevant alternatives will be traded-off in section V. 
The following presentation of the SNAP concept is based 
on the schematic sketched in Fig. 3. At the top, the figure 
illustrates the flow of the OS NMA data in the Galileo E1-B 
I/NAV message, whose basic principles are briefly recalled 
hereafter (for more details, please refer to [25] and [26]). At the 
bottom, Fig. 3 sketches the proposed concept, depicting both 
slow and fast bursts, together with their possible relation with 
OS NMA data.  
The time scheduling and the relations between subsequent 
TESLA keys and MAC tags in a typical OS NMA 
configuration are also illustrated in Fig. 3, according to the 
specifications presented in [26]. Each I/NAV page (with a 
length of 2 seconds) is composed by two parts, denoted as even 
and odd pages parts and lasting 1 second each. Only odd page 
parts contain the field referred to as 'reserved 1', which has a 
length of 40 bits and is devoted to the transmission of NMA 
data. By processing such fields, the receiver is able to 
demodulate 40 bits every 2 seconds from each received SIS, 
for an equivalent data rate of 20 bits per second, dedicated to 
OS NMA service.  
For the sake of simplicity, Fig. 3 assumes that the 
information (and the entropy) related to the 40 bits is uniformly 
spread in the time slot of each odd page part. This means that 
the reception of such bits will require the processing of 1 
second of symbols every odd second of the Galileo System 
Time (GST). In fact, all the data bits in each I/NAV page part 
are convolutionally encoded, with rate ½, and interleaved with 
a block interleaver characterized by 30 columns and 8 rows 
[27]. This channel coding scheme makes a direct identification 
of each 'reserved 1' bit in the stream of SIS symbols a non-
straightforward task [28]. Among the 40 bits of each 'reserved 
1' field, 8 bits are dedicated to the transmission of the NMA 
headers and the signed root key (i.e. the HKROOT section), 
while the remaining 32 bits carry on the truncated MAC tags 
and the keys of the TESLA chain (i.e. the MACK section). 
According to [26], a typical NMA configuration allows 
transmitting a MACK section every 10 seconds. Each MACK 
section contains 3 MAC tags (and their related 'MAC-info' 
fields) and 1 key. In this example, each MAC tag consists of 10 
bits, while each MAC-info field has a length of 16 bits. Thus, 
each MAC tag+info section has a total length of 26 bits. In a 
window of 10 seconds (i.e. from    to    + 10	s in Fig. 3), the 
3 MAC tag+info sections are spread over about 4.4 seconds in 
the received satellite signal, as shown by the yellow boxes in 
Fig. 3. Similarly, a single TESLA key (e.g.      in Fig. 3) has a 
length of 82 bits and is spread over about 4.6 seconds.  
Fig. 3 also shows that, at the time instant GST  =   , a 
receiver has only received the current TESLA key   , together 
with the previous I/NAV message. At this point, it has to wait 
at least 9 seconds (i.e. until approximately    + 9	s) in order to 
retrieve the necessary data to perform the NMA verification 
procedure. In fact, the receiver needs to correctly decode the 3 
MAC tag+info sections and the next key     , then to verify 
the validity of      against previous   , and finally to re-
Fig. 2. Scheme for the insertion of slow and fast bursts in the PRN 
sequence. 
  
compute and check the 3 MAC tags with     , as shown by the 
blue arrows in the figure. 
In the example, a burst (CSKS or CSKF) with a length of 1 
second is transmitted every 2 seconds, thus maintaining at least 
1 second of nominal (predictable) code sequence, suitable to be 
potentially processed even by non-participant receivers (i.e., 
not capable/interested to process the authentication 
information). As anticipated in section II, the time distribution 
of the code chips and, thus, the length of each burst is a 
relevant design parameter. In principle, such time slot length 
can be increased up to the limit of encrypting the whole code 
sequence, without leaving any portion of nominal PRN 
sequence in the transmitted signal. 
In principle, these bursts can be generated by the satellites 
reusing the OS NMA data (i.e. MACs and keys). The same 
information can be used also by a participant receiver in order 
to verify the received bursts, as discussed later. 
An innovative aspect of the SNAP concept resides in the 
fact that, contrary to those authentication solutions in which the 
verification at the receiver is performed separately on each 
single channel, the SNAP is able to exploit the information 
received from all the in-view satellites, thus obtaining a 
solution suitable for a two-steps authentication procedure. 
More in detail, the fast bursts for all the satellite signals can be 
generated from the same cryptographically-generated 
spreading code chips, but a unique circular shift, that depends 
on the satellite identifier can be applied to each of them. In this 
way, the bursts received from different satellites at a given time 
instant consist of the same code chips sequence, just shifted in 
a different way for every satellite. As an example, the CSKF 
bursts for all the satellite signals can be generated from the 
same code chips, using a block or stream cipher initialized by a 
common cryptographic key computed as follows: 
 crypto	key  ∝ 	Hash	 	    	|	GST 	  
where Hash	{	∙	} represents a cryptographically secure hash 
function (i.e. a digest),      is the successive TESLA key, and 
GST  is the current Galileo System Time. Note that the symbol 
∝ is used for the sake of generality, aiming to cover also the 
case of a non-linear operation on the output of the hash 
function (e.g. a truncation). 
Then, different CSK shifts can be applied to each burst, 
depending on the satellite identifier (Sat. ID), previous key   , 
and next NMA bits (next 'reserved 1' field, that will be 
disclosed 1 second later): 
shift  ∝ Hash		 	Sat	ID.	 	  	 next	'reserved	1'	field	  
Being the crypto	key  independent from the Sat. ID, the 
bursts received from different satellites at a given time instant 
GSTm consist of the same code chips sequence, just shifted in a 
different way for every satellite. In this way, the receiver can 
first cross-authenticate couples of satellite signals by applying 
a codeless CSK correlation between bursts from two satellites, 
properly shifted and aligned, i.e., first step authentication. It 
can then a-posteriori verify both slow and fast bursts, as soon 
as      will be disclosed i.e., second step authentication. 
The concept for the working principle of the two steps 
authentication at the receiver level is schematically represented 
in Fig. 4. The receiver, before being able to verify the content 
 
 
Fig. 3. Schematic of the SNAP concept: tentative time scheduling and relation between NMA bits and SCA bursts. 
  
of the fast bursts, can check the consistency among signals 
from different satellites. The bursts from couples of satellites 
can be stored in a buffer, properly shifted on the basis of the 
value of the last    and then correlated to verify their 
consistency. As obvious, a codeless correlation gives different 
performance respect to a classical correlation operation, and the 
technique might be suitable for proper working scenario 
conditions. At the same time, the 1st step authentication is able 
to considerably improve the authentication performance, 
reducing the TBA and TTA metrics (e.g. from 10 to 2 seconds) 
under different kinds of attack. 
This two-step procedure is tailored to the CSKF bursts, 
while a simplified approach can be used for the generation and 
the verification of the CSKS bursts (e.g. similar to the Public-
SCA concept in [14]). In this case, a different code burst can be 
transmitted by each satellite, for example simply using a 
different key      or by adding the Sat. ID as an additional 
input of the hash function in (1). In this way, at the receiver 
side, the information related to crypto keys and CSK shifts will 
be retrieved from the NMA bits, thus achieving a TBA of about 
10 seconds. In principle, the authentication latency of some 
CSKS bursts can potentially be extended to several minutes, 
periodically introducing a delayed release of the TESLA key 
with some similarities to what done in the case of “slow 
MACs” in [26].  
C. A tentative time schedule and verification procedure 
Referring again to Fig. 3, we present here a first practical 
example with a high-level implementation of the SCA concept.  
At the time    a CSKS burst has just been received. At this 
point, in order to verify it, the receiver must wait to correctly 
decode the next key      from the OS NMA component. Thus, 
the authentication latency between the beginning of a CSKS 
burst (i.e.    − 1	s) and the last bit of      (approximately 
   + 9	s) is consistent with the target TBA of 10 seconds. Such 
time scheduling for the reception and the a-posteriori 
verification of CSKS bursts also repeats in following time 
windows, as shown by the orange arrows of Fig. 3. 
As for the CSKF bursts, a different approach is adopted for 
their generation, enabling the two-steps authentication. At the 
time   , the key    has just been disclosed, while the next key 
     is still unpredictable from a spoofer point of view. For this 
reason, the code chips of the following 4 CSKF bursts can be 
generated by means of a (block or stream) cipher, initialized by 
a crypto key computed as described by equation (1), and 
circularly shifted by following equation (2). 
At the time    + 2	s a CSKF burst has just been received 
from each satellite in view. In order to perform the 1st step 
verification, the receiver must wait until the next 'reserved 1' 
field will be received in an odd I/NAV page part (i.e. until 
about    + 3	s). At this point, the shift of each CSKF burst can 
be recomputed, and the burst shifted back. Since they have 
been generated starting from the same (yet unknown) code 
sequence, they can finally be used in a codeless correlation to 
check the consistency of bursts received from pairs of 
satellites, as shown in Fig. 4.  
In this case, the authentication latency between the 
beginning of a fast burst (i.e.    + 1	s) and the last 'reserved 1' 
bit needed for the codeless verification (approx.    + 3	s) leads 
to a TBA of 2 seconds. Such 1st step verification procedure is 
repeated for the 3 subsequent CSKF bursts (i.e. from    + 3	s to 
   + 8	s), as shown by the green arrows of Fig. 3.  
The next key      can be considered as completely 
disclosed only at time    + 9	s, when the receiver is able to 
verify the CSKS burst previously received from    − 1	s to   . 
In addition, at    + 9	s, the receiver is able to implement the 
2nd step verification also on each previous CSKF bursts, using 
    , to locally generate an exact replica of the bursts and 
verify them by means of a classical (non-codeless) correlation. 
As a final remark, it is worth mentioning that the 
verification procedures for the CSKS bursts and the 2
nd step 
check on the CSKF bursts mainly take advantage by the 
cryptographic robustness of the TESLA chain of keys. On the 
other hand, the 1st step verification of CSKF bursts is based on 
all the 'reserved 1' bits, thus using not only the TESLA keys, 
but also the MAC tags. In fact, the 3 MAC tags received 
approximately from    to    + 4.4	s can be considered 
unpredictable until the disclosure of     . 
IV. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST DIFFERENT THREATS  
When designing an authentication scheme, it is essential to 
define potential threats and attack scenarios the technique shall 
be able to cope with. Considering recent results from the 
scientific literature [9][10], different families of attacks have 
been identified as likely future threats for several applications 
based on GNSS. They are listed hereafter, sorted according to 
an increasing associated cost and complexity, i.e. from low-
cost attacks, more likely to be implemented, to the most 
expensive ones, with limited feasibility on a large scale: 
 Meaconing-like attacks are based on the reception and 
rebroadcasting of an entire block of radio frequency 
 
Fig. 4. Schematic concept for the 1st and 2nd step authentication at 
the receiver level. 
  
(RF) spectrum containing an ensemble of received 
GNSS signals, without distinctions between different 
satellite signals. A basic attack belonging to this 
category can be easily implemented with a receiving 
antenna, connected to an amplifier and to a 
transmitting antenna (i.e. signal repeater). It is mostly 
applicable to a stationary victim only, being quite 
complex or impractical to move the meaconer in a 
plausible way in dynamic conditions. 
 Simplistic or Intermediate spoofing (without 
directional antennas): in this case the attacker is able 
to generate counterfeit GNSS signals, not necessarily 
reflecting any information on the current broadcast 
signals. It can be put in practice by using low cost 
hardware for receiving and replaying the GNSS 
signals, potentially including customized software-
defined signal simulators/synthesizers in order to 
control and/or modify some of the signals parameters, 
or by using commercial hardware RF simulators, that 
are normally expensive and moderately complex to 
use. In the case of intermediate attacks, the spoofer 
can implement specific approaches to perform an on 
the fly estimation-and-replay of each symbol of the 
navigation message, i.e., Security Code Estimation 
And Replay (SCER) [29]. In addition, the spoofer can 
also take advantage of some kind of prediction, as in 
the case of the Forward Estimation Attack (FEA) or 
the State Modeling Attack (SMA) [22]. 
 Sophisticated attacks with (multiple) high-gain 
directional antenna(s): these attacks are based on the 
use of one single antenna or multiple antennas with 
enough gain to directly estimate and spoof all the 
signal components from a single or multiple GNSS 
satellites. In detail, each antenna is pointed toward a 
satellite and, thanks to the directional gain of the 
antenna, it is possible to raise unknown or encrypted 
code chips beyond the noise floor, to directly read and 
rebroadcast them with limited latency. These attacks 
are clearly more expensive and complex, due to the 
high costs related to the high gain antennas and 
complexity associated to the attack setting-up.  
Meaconing-like and sophisticated attacks with directional 
antennas can be considered as threats beyond of the scope of 
the SIS design and/or not relevant for directly assessing the 
robustness of NMA and SCA solutions, since they also require 
specific countermeasures at the receiver level. 
On the contrary, for Simplistic or Intermediate attacks, the 
SNAP technique is able to increase the spoofing robustness of 
the basic OS NMA verification, by making impractical or 
detectable several specific types of attacks. The fact that the 
data message and spreading code solutions work 
interconnected to each other further protect the authenticated 
data bits, thus increasing the overall level of security, as also 
highlighted for example in [20]. 
V. TRADE-OFF ANALYSIS AND PARAMETERS DEFINITION 
As said, the implementation of an authentication concept is 
open to several choices and optimizations, mainly related to 
specific signal characteristics. It is worth remarking that the 
achievable performance of the proposed SCA concept strongly 
depends on specific implementation requirements and design 
choices. 
After briefly recalling the used methodology in section 
V.A, section V.B describes trade-off analysis and section V.C 
summarizes the consequent recommendations. 
A. Used Methodology: the Driving Criteria 
The methodology used to trade-off all the available signal 
options takes into account both quantitative results from 
simulations (e.g. as those already presented by the authors in 
[10]) and qualitative analyses based on the maximization and 
harmonization of three main criteria. In details: 
 first of all, the authentication performance has been 
taken into account, in order to assess the technique 
mainly in terms of two metrics, the TBA and the 
TTA; 
 in addition, the criterion of spoofing robustness has 
been used to measure the level of resilience against a 
set of specific spoofing attacks, considered significant 
for applications based on the open services; 
 the third criteria, referred to as current signal 
valorization, has been adopted to assess the level of 
reuse and valorization of the current Galileo OS signal 
and messages structures. 
In the definition of the authentication method, the three 
criteria have not been considered separately, nor maximized 
independently from each other. On the contrary, the 
methodology we followed tried to balance all the criteria and 
find a solution, suitable for the evolution of the Galileo OS 
signal, and able to achieve competitive performance in terms of 
authentication requirement and spoofing robustness. 
B. Trade-off analysis 
On the basis of the three introduced criteria, this section 
analyses the trade-off for four specific signal characteristics: 1) 
Inputs for the SCA bursts generation, 2) Signal component for 
the SCA bursts allocation, 3) Type of allocation of SCA bursts, 
and 4) Power level of each component carrying authentication 
features. 
1) Inputs for the SCA bursts generation. 
In principle, the SCA bursts can be generated starting from 
different inputs. In fact, the needed cryptographic keys and/or 
seeds can be obtained by using: 
 only OS NMA bits (TESLA keys and MACs); 
 only bits transmitted on a new data signal component 
(e.g., CSK modulated); 
 an intermediate solution, using bits from OS NMA 
plus few additional bits from a new component. 
All the three solutions present good authentication 
performance. In the case the inputs for the SCA burst 
generation are only OS NMA bits, it is possible to obtain a 
reduced TBA (e.g. 2 s), and a TTA limited to 10 s (worst case). 
  
In the case an additional data component is used, the 
authentication performance can be further enhanced. As for an 
example, longer keys (e.g., more than 82 bits) can be 
transmitted on the new component and/or a higher data rate can 
be achieved (e.g., by means of a CSK modulation). In this case, 
the 1st step authentication can potentially achieve TTA ≈ TBA 
≈ 2 s, or even less.  
As presented in section IV, the solution based on the use of 
OS NMA bits only is able to make impractical and/or 
detectable several spoofing attacks. The use of bits from a new 
data component might be able to provide robustness also 
against the specific attacks based on the transmission of 
arbitrary NMA bits, consistent with the CSKF bursts. On the 
other hand, it has to be considered that the first option allows 
for the further protection of the NMA bits, used as SCA inputs. 
Finally, the use of OS NMA bits (OS NMA only or 
intermediate solution) adds value to the current signal design 
and, in addition, NMA bits will be intrinsically protected by 
SCA. 
2) Signal component for the SCA bursts allocation. 
SCA bursts, both fast and slow, can be allocated on 
different signal components: 
 on a modified version of the E1-B component; 
 on a modified version of the E1-C component; 
 on the new signal component E1-D. 
Solutions based on the use of E1-B or C have to consider 
potential performance degradations for non-participant 
receivers. More in details, in the case of bursts inserted only on 
E1-B, data demodulation performance is typically affected (if 
the tracking is done on E1-C), while, in the case of bursts only 
on E1-C, the tracking performance is affected. On the opposite, 
solutions based on the new component E1-D present potential 
higher flexibility for implementing both NMA and SCA. In 
fact, they present less constraints on SCA burst length, the 
SCA latency is potentially lower (not constrained by E1-B OS 
NMA data rate bottleneck), and the values of TBA, TTA, and 
TTFAF can be potentially reduced. 
In the case of authentication features only on E1-B (NMA 
and SCA on the same component), a reduced spoofing 
robustness can be experienced, since the spoofer is only forced 
to attack a single component. On the contrary, in case of E1-C 
or E1-D, authentication features on separated components 
might increase the spoofing robustness.  
The higher values of current signal valorization can be 
obtained by using a modified E1-B or E1-C component, but 
with a possible impact on its backward compatibility. 
3) Type of allocation of SCA bursts. 
Fast and slow SCA bursts can be allocated: 
 on a single component (joint allocation); 
 on multiple signal components (separated allocation). 
Solutions based on separated allocation of fast and slow 
bursts are able to optimize the burst scheduling, thus enhancing 
the authentication performance. 
In the case the SCA bursts are split on multiple signal 
components, the spoofer might be forced to attack each of 
them, modifying and making consistent each authentication 
feature. For this reason the spoofing robustness is considered 
higher in this case. 
The level of valorization depends on which are the signal 
components used to allocate the SCA bursts, rather than on the 
choice of using single or multiple components. Nonetheless, a 
solution based on multiple components would potentially 
reuse/valorize at least one existing signal component. 
4) Power level of each component carrying authentication 
features. 
For instance, the power levels of each signal component 
carrying authentication features can be: 
 at nominal value (referred to as 0 dB); 
 at -10 dB from nominal power. 
As obvious, solutions at nominal power present higher 
authentication performance. For example, signal components 
at -10 dB are not suitable for the allocation of fast bursts, 
leading to an excessive increase on the required burst length in 
order to be compatible with the 1st step codeless check.  
On the other hand, low power signals are generally more 
robust to spoofing attacks, since they force a higher 
cost/complexity at the attacker side. In the case of a SCA 
component at -10 dB, in fact, a spoofer that wants to read on-
the-fly the values of the code chips needs an antenna with a 
gain of 10 dB higher.  
Finally, signal components at -10 dB would better fit with 
the current signal structure. For example, in this case, there is 
the possibility to reuse one or more E1 OS components, as the 
BOC(6,1) portion of the CBOC modulated signals. 
C. Recommendations  
The analysis on the threats robustness together with that 
that on the parameters trade-off allows for the drafting of the 
following list of recommendations, thus helping in the 
definition of an implementation option (see section VI). 
First of all, a SCA approach can offer additional protection 
to the OS NMA concept for Galileo E1-B. This is motivated by 
the time binding concept, recently mentioned in [20]. A joint 
NMA + SCA approach implies that authenticated navigation 
data and spreading code chips are bound together, thus forcing 
the attacker to contemporaneously spoof both of them. A joint 
approach, in fact, is able to detect specific attacks undetectable 
by NMA alone and/or improve the overall authentication 
performance (e.g., reducing the TBA and TTA from 10 to 2 s).  
The transmission of SCA bursts and the delayed release of 
crypto keys via NMA must happen in well separated time slots. 
This is necessary to limit the feasibility of attacks exploiting on 
the fly estimation or prediction of NMA symbols, as for attacks 
like SCER, FEA, or SMA. 
  
It is recommended to use the possible additional capacity 
on a new data component (e.g. E1-D) not to further reduce the 
TBA (by a faster key release), but to further protect the E1-B 
OS NMA data, for example allowing to detect and mitigate data 
demodulation errors on the I/NAV in case of degraded signal 
conditions (e.g. low     ⁄  in urban scenarios). 
Specific design choices can also offer the possibility of a 
multi-step synchronization and authentication procedure, 
suitable to an incremental adoption/exploitation and to relax 
the receiver synchronization requirements.  
Finally, it is recommended to adopt a solution based on two 
signal components, that offer different power levels and 
frequency diversity, thus enhancing the robustness against 
specific spoofing attacks. One component at nominal power 
level to assure high authentication performance, and one low 
power component to constrain possible spoofers to use high-
gain directional antennas. 
VI. A POSSIBLE WORKING POINT 
This section presents an example of implementation option, 
following referred to as working point, for the SNAP solution.  
The schematic of the power spectral density (PSD) of the 
designed signal is represented in Fig. 5, together with the 
allocation of the authentication bursts. 
The working point foresees the use of two new signals 
components (in addition to the existing E1-B and E1-C): 
 E1-D: data channel at nominal power level, possibly 
located at an offset carrier with respect to the E1 
carrier frequency. It can be used in time multiplexing, 
for alternatively carrying bursts and cryptographic 
data for the bursts verification; 
 E1-E: low power component (e.g. -10 dB w.r.t. other 
signal components), possibly located around E1 
carrier frequency. It is not compatible to data 
demodulation, thus potentially carrying a fully 
encrypted spreading code sequence (or open and 
encrypted codes time multiplexed). 
As for the four signal characteristics traded-off in section 
V.B, the SNAP working point proposes to have: 
1) Inputs for the SCA bursts generation: 
Input data from E1-B OS NMA plus additional data from the 
E1-D data channel. 
2) Signal component for the SCA bursts allocation: 
Slow bursts on the E1-E component, and fast bursts on the 
E1-D component. A Binary Offset Carrier BOC(6,1) 
modulation can be used for the slow bursts, while an Offset 
Binary Phase Shift Keying (OBPSK) modulation can be 
adopted for the fast bursts. 
3) Type of allocation of SCA bursts: 
Fast and slow bursts are allocated on multiple signal 
components. 
4) Power level of each component carrying authentication 
features: 
The two signal components are at different power levels: 
slow bursts on E1-E at -10 dB, and fast bursts on E1-D at 
nominal power level. The first component is intended to 
constrain possible spoofers to use directional antennas with a 
very high-gain, while the second component is suitable to 
speed up the authentication performance by means of fast 
bursts. 
The SNAP solution implemented in this way is capable to 
provide two levels of service, depending on possible receiver 
implementation profiles. In the case a low-complexity 
processing is required, the receiver can only use E1-B and E1-
E components: the authentication information will be retrieved 
from the OS NMA bits of E1-B and used to verify the slow 
bursts on E1-E. Obviously, this profile will give limited 
authentication performance, leading to a TBA of the order of 
10 seconds. On the other hand, a full complexity receiver, able 
to use E1-B, E1-E, and E1-D will provide a high performance 
service, with TBA of around 2 seconds. 
In addition, SNAP is potentially compatible to alternative 
and intermediate implementation profiles, suitable to a medium 
complexity implementation. The receiver in fact can use E1-B 
plus E1-E to verify the slow burst and E1-D only to perform 
the 1st step authentication, with the codeless correlation on the 
fast bursts. This implementation profile will lead to an 
intermediate level of performance: the TBA is again of the 
order of 2 seconds, though a possible availability degradation 
has to be considered in low     ⁄  conditions. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK  
The SNAP concept is an innovative solution for the 
authentication of both navigation data bits and spreading code 
chips, designed to be compatible with an evolution of the 
Galileo E1 OS signal. In principle, it can be potentially adapted 
also to other civil GNSS signals. The significance of the work 
mainly lies in three elements. 
First, though the technique is innovative and able to achieve 
predefined authentication performance, it exploits the structure 
of the legacy Galileo signal and the characteristics of the OS 
E1-B E1-D
E1-EE1-E
FastSlowSlow
PSD
Bursts
 
Fig. 5. Possible working point: schematic of the power spectral 
density of the signal components and allocation of the bursts. 
  
NMA, thus being capable of increasing the spoofing 
robustness. 
Second, the work investigates the performance of the 
solution under different families of spoofing attacks. The 
advantages of the SNAP are described against solutions 
entirely based on the authentication of the navigation data 
components only, and those techniques that implement both 
NMA and SCA, but leave them independent from each other. 
Third, the two-steps authentication concept allows the 
receiver to adapt its authentication verification process, 
depending on specific requirements and conditions. For 
example, receivers used for applications with low 
authentication requirements might decide to only verify the 
first step authentication, while more demanding users might 
implement the full two-step process, at a cost of an increased 
complexity within the receiver.  
A. Open Points and Future Activities  
The work presented in the paper gives several cues for 
future studies, concerning both the system and receiver levels. 
As for the formers, example of activities focused on the signal 
design are: 
 the investigation of the use of an additional data 
channel (non-SIS) for authentication purposes, as also 
outlined in [20]; 
 the study of alternative/complementary authentication 
solutions, based on specific design parameters (e.g., 
variable waveform, frequency hopping, variable 
power level, etc.).  
On the other hand, strategies for the verification of the 
authentication information at the user side can be further 
studied and optimized: 
 as an example, specific approaches that exploit 
information available within the receiver (e.g.,     ⁄ ) 
for the verification of authentication information 
should be investigated. Such algorithms would allow 
the receiver to output not only a binary information 
(i.e. authentic signal or not), but also an associated 
confidence interval; 
 in addition, another important aspect to consolidate 
concerns the achievable performance of both 1st step 
and 2nd step authentication verification  in terms of 
detection and false alarm probabilities (i.e. Receiver 
Operating Characteristic – ROC curves). Preliminary 
simulations have been already carried out in Additive 
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel, confirming 
the feasibility of the SNAP concept and showing 
promising performance results. In any case, future 
activities should include the validation of the concept, 
also with extensive simulations covering more 
realistic channel models (e.g. presence of multipath, 
fading, and dynamic conditions); 
 furthermore, additional studies should be conducted 
introducing refinements able to strengthen the 
solution availability also in degraded scenarios. For 
example, a simple detection strategy based on the 
mutual correlation among a set (instead of pairs) of 
satellites signals shall be investigated. This can limit 
the impact of false alarms on single channels, thus 
improving the overall performance. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
This article will present some findings of a project funded 
by the European Commission under the Horizon 2020 
Framework Program (Funding Reference No. 
435/PP/GRO/RCH/15/8384). 
In addition, the authors want to thank Airbus Defence and 
Space GmbH (project prime contractor) for their constructive 
comments, helpful to improve the analysis. 
 
REFERENCES 
[1] Anon., “Vulnerability assessment of the transportation infrastructure 
relying on the global positioning system,” J.A. Volpe National 
Transportation Systems Center, 2001. 
[2] M. Jones, “Spoofing in the Black Sea: What really happened?,” GPS 
Word website, October 2017.  Available at: 
http://gpsworld.com/spoofing-in-the-black-sea-what-really-happened/ 
[3] S. Pullen, G.X. Gao, “GNSS Jamming in the name of Privacy,” Inside 
GNSS, Vol. 7, No. 2, March/April 2012. 
[4] J. C. Grabowsky, “Personal privacy Jammers. Locating Jersey PPDs 
Jamming GBAS Safety-of-Life Signals,” GPS World, Vol. 23, No. 4, 
April 2012. 
[5] M. L. Psiaki, T. E. Humphreys, and B. Stauffer, “Attackers can spoof 
navigation signals without our knowledge. Here's how to fight back GPS 
lies,” IEEE Spectrum, Vol. 53, Issue 8, August 2016. 
[6] D. P. Shepard, J. A. Bhatti, and T. E. Humphreys, “Drone Hack: 
Spoofing Attack Demonstration on a Civilian Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle,” GPS World, August 2012. 
[7] A. Jafarnia-Jahromi, A. Broumandan, J. Nielsen, and G. Lachapelle, 
“GPS Vulnerability to Spoofing Threats and a Review of Antispoofing 
Techniques,” International Journal of Navigation and Observation, vol. 
2012, Article ID 127072, 16 pages, 2012. Doi:10.1155/2012/127072. 
[8] M. L. Psiaki and T. E. Humphreys, “GNSS Spoofing and Detection,”  
Proceedings of the IEEE, Vol. 104, No. 6, pp. 1258-1270, June 2016. 
Doi: 10.1109/JPROC.2016.2526658. 
[9] F. Dovis, GNSS Interference Threats and Countermeasures. Artech 
House, Norwood, MA, Jan. 2015, ISBN 9781608078103. 
[10] D. Margaria, B. Motella, M. Anghileri, J. J. Floch, I. Fernandez-
Hernandez, and M. Paonni, “Signal Structure-Based Authentication for 
Civil GNSSs: Recent Solutions and Perspectives,” in IEEE Signal 
Processing Magazine, Vol. 34, No. 5, pp. 27-37, Sept. 2017. Doi: 
10.1109/MSP.2017.2715898. 
[11] European GNSS (Galileo) open service. Signal-in-space interface 
control document. OS SIS ICD, Issue 1.3, Dec. 2016. 
[12] I. Fernández-Hernández, V. Rijmen, G. Seco-Granados, J. Simon, I. 
Rodríguez, and J. David Calle, “A Navigation Message Authentication 
Proposal for the Galileo Open Service,” NAVIGATION, Journal of The 
Institute of Navigation, Vol. 63, No. 1, Spring 2016, pp. 85-102. 
[13] GSA website, “Assuring authentication for all”, Aug. 3, 2016. Available 
at: https://www.gsa.europa.eu/news/assuring-authentication-all  
[14] L. Scott, “Anti-Spoofing & Authenticated Signal Architectures for Civil 
Navigation Systems,” Proc. of the 16th International Technical Meeting 
of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION GPS/GNSS 
2003), Portland, OR, Sept. 2003, pp. 1543-1552. 
[15] Kuhn, M. G., “An Asymmetric Security Mechanism for Navigation 
Signals,” Proc. of the 6th Information Hiding Workshop, 2004, pp. 239–
252. 
  
[16] O. Pozzobon, L. Canzian, M. Danieletto and A. D. Chiara, “Anti-
spoofing and open GNSS signal authentication with signal 
authentication sequences,” Proc. of 5th ESA Workshop on Satellite 
Navigation Technologies and European Workshop on GNSS Signals and 
Signal Processing (NAVITEC 2010), Noordwijk, Dec. 2010, pp. 1-6. 
[17] O. Pozzobon, “Keeping the Spoofs Out – Signal Authentication Services 
for Future GNSS,” Inside GNSS, May/June 2011, pp. 48-55. 
[18] O. Pozzobon, G. Gamba, M. Canale, S. Fantinato, “Supersonic GNSS 
Authentication Codes,” Proc. of the 27th International Technical Meeting 
of The Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 
2014), Tampa, Florida, Sept. 2014, pp. 2862-2869. 
[19] O. Pozzobon, G. Gamba, M. Canale, S. Fantinato, “From Data Schemes 
to Supersonic Codes – GNSS Authentication for Modernized Signals,” 
Inside GNSS, pp. 55-64, Jan./Feb. 2015. 
[20] J. M. Anderson et al., “Chips-Message Robust Authentication (Chimera) 
for GPS Civilian Signals,” Proc. of the 30th International Technical 
Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation (ION 
GNSS + 2017), Portland, OR, Sept. 2017, pp. 2388-2416. 
[21] J. T. Curran, M. Bavaro, P. Closas, and M. Navarro, “On the Threat of 
Systematic Jamming of GNSS,” Proc. of the 29th International Technical 
Meeting of The Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION 
GNSS+ 2016), Portland, OR, Sept. 2016, pp. 313-321. 
[22] J. T. Curran and C. O'Driscoll, “Message Authentication as an Anti-
Spoofing Mechanism,” Working Paper, June 2017. Available at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317950338_Message_Authenti
cation_as_an_Anti-Spoofing_Mechanism  
[23] G. Caparra, S. Ceccato, N. Laurenti, and J. Cramer, “Feasibility and 
Limitations of Self-Spoofing Attacks on GNSS Signals with Message 
Authentication,” Proc. of the 30th International Technical Meeting of 
The Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2017), 
Portland, OR, September 2017, pp. 3968-3984. 
[24] G. Caparra et al., “Design Drivers and New Trends for Navigation 
Message Authentication Schemes for GNSS Systems,” Inside GNSS, pp. 
64-73, Sept./Oct. 2016. 
[25] I. Fernández-Hernández, V. Rijmen, G. Seco-Granados, J. Simon, I. 
Rodríguez, and J. David Calle, “A Navigation Message Authentication 
Proposal for the Galileo Open Service,” Navigation, Journal of The 
Institute of Navigation, vol. 63, no. 1, 2016, pp. 85-102. 
[26] European Commission, Galileo Navigation Message Authentication 
Specification for Signal-In-Space Testing. Ref. ARES(2016)6620281, 
v1.0, 25/11/2016. 
[27] European Union, European GNSS (Galileo) Open Service Signal In 
Space Interface Control Document. OS SIS ICD. v. 1.3, Dec. 2016. 
[28] I. Fernández-Hernández and G. Seco-Granados, “Galileo NMA signal 
unpredictability and anti-replay protection,” 2016 International 
Conference on Localization and GNSS (ICL-GNSS), Barcelona, 2016, 
pp. 1-5. doi: 10.1109/ICL-GNSS.2016.7533686.  
[29] T. E. Humphreys, “Detection Strategy for Cryptographic GNSS Anti-
Spoofing,” in IEEE Transactions on Aerospace and Electronic Systems, 
vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 1073-1090, April 2013. 
doi: 10.1109/TAES.2013.6494400. 
 
